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Abstract—With explosive growth in the number of mobile
devices, the mobile malware is rapidly spreading as well, and the
number of encountered malware families is increasing. Existing
solutions, which are mainly based on one malware detector
running on the phone or in the cloud, are no longer effective.
Main problem lies in the fact that it might be impossible to create
a unique mobile malware detector that would be able to detect
different malware families with high accuracy, being at the same
time lightweight enough not to drain battery quickly and fast
enough to give results of detection promptly.
The proposed approach to mobile malware detection is analo-
gous to general practitioner versus specialist approach to dealing
with a medical problem. Similarly to a general practitioner that,
based on indicative symptoms identifies potential illnesses and
sends the patient to an appropriate specialist, our detection
system distinguishes among symptoms representing different
malware families and, once the symptoms are detected, it triggers
specific analyses. A system monitoring application operates in
the same way as a general practitioner. It is able to distinguish
between different symptoms and trigger appropriate detection
mechanisms. As an analogy to different specialists, an ensemble
of detectors, each of which specifically trained for a particular
malware family, is used. The main challenge of the approach is
to define representative symptoms of different malware families
and train detectors accordingly to them. The main goal of the
poster is to foster discussion on the most representative symptoms
of different malware families and to discuss initial results in this
area obtained by using Malware Genome project dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
As smartphone has become the most popular device on the
planet, its security is fundamental, having direct impact on pro-
ductivity and well-being of millions of individuals, companies,
and governments. However, the implications on security of
rapid deployment coupled with always-on connectivity are still
insufficiently understood. That is why threat alerts constantly
grew year by year, and according to McAfee Labs [1] the
collection of mobile malware continued its steady climb as it
broke 6 million samples in the forth quarter of 2014, up 14%
over the third quarter of the same year.
Any security mechanism targeted toward mobile systems
must take their limitations into consideration as they may
significantly limit the ability to run complex malware detection
systems on the device. Furthermore, if a user notices that the
malware detection system drains battery quickly or slows down
the operating system, chances are high that he/she will turn it
off and leave the device unprotected.
The methodology that we propose is taking the mentioned
limitations into account by using a lightweight symptom
monitoring infrastructure that is able to detect suspicious
symptoms, and triggers a dedicated, more precise but possibly
more complex detector that is previously trained to identify
the malware family with higher confidence. Although the goal
of the proposed methodology is to develop a comprehensive
malware detection system following the mentioned approach,
the main focus of the poster is to discuss its first part: the
symptom monitoring infrastructure. We would like to foster
discussion on different features that can be collected and
observed on the smartphone, their connection to different
malware families and relevance to the detection accuracy.
II. STATE OF THE ART
In order to extract the most indicative symptoms, feature
selection and extraction has to be done. Broad survey covering
the state of the art in feature selection can be found in [2].
In [3] the authors propose to identify malware with sets of
permissions. The authors concluded that although the number
of permissions alone is not sufficient to identify malware,
they could be used as part of a set of classification features,
provided that all permissions common to the malware set
are infrequent among non-malicious applications. In [4], as a
feature for detecting likelihood of malware infection, type of
applications running on a device is used. While observing just
this feature is not enough to give precise answer about device
being attacked, we believe that using it as one of the indicators
could give good results. As outlined in [5], several solutions
rely on observation of battery power. However, to what extent
malware can be detected on smartphones monitoring just the
battery power remains an open research question, having in
mind continuously changing user behavior.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY AND INITIAL RESULTS
The system monitoring application, running on the phone,
collects information related to its condition, and upon suspi-
cious symptoms detection triggers more specific detection. The
outline of the approach is presented in Figure 1. More detailed
description of the complete methodology can be found in [6].
In order to identify the most indicative symptoms, our idea is
Fig. 1. A representation of the proposed approach
to combine features from state-of-the-art (sets of permissions,
likelihood of malware infection, and battery power) together
with memory consumption information, processor usage and
network behaviour. By applying statistical methods, we will
define the most representative ones with respect to different
malware families. During the training phase, malware samples
from different families are executed, relevant data collected
and afterwards analysed. At runtime, the symptoms monitoring
infrastructure collects information about the phone and, based
on their values and previously defined symptoms, triggers the
appropriate, more specific detection.
Initial results have been obtained by analysing the follow-
ing malware families, taken from the Malware Genome project
dataset [7]: Gold Dream that spies on SMS messages received
by users so as on incoming/outgoing phone calls and then
uploads them to a remote server without user’s awareness;
Geinimi Trojan that compromises personal data on a user’s
phone and sends it to the remote servers (it sends location
coordinates, device identifiers, so as a list of the installed apps
on the phone); Base Bridge upon activation it communicates
with a control server, dials calls or sends SMS messages (it
also blocks messages from the mobile carrier to prevent users
from getting consumption fee updates on time); Fake Player
that pretends to be a movie player, but instead sends SMS
messages to present numbers; jSMShider Trojan that affects
devices where the owner has downloaded a custom ROM or
rooted phone; and Pjapps Trojan that opens a back door on
the compromised device and retrieves command from a remote
command and control server.
Malware samples (318 apps) belonging to the six men-
tioned families have been executed in the Android SDK, virtual
device running Android 4.0 (API 14). For the purpose of this
poster, only the importance of features related to CPU and
memory are reported, since, to the best of our knowledge, such
analysis have not been done before. CPU activity is described
in more detail by the following features: total CPU usage,
user CPU usage, kernel CPU usage, page minor and major
faults. To investigate memory usage, all features related to
apps memory allocation obtained by using ”adb shell dumpsys
meminfo <package name>” command have been collected.
Features have been analysed with Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) method using Ranker search in the Weka
data mining tool [8]. Variance is set to 95%. Attribute noise
is filtered by transforming to the PCA space, eliminating
TABLE I. THE MOST RELEVANT FEATURES PER MALWARE FAMILY
Gold Dream Geinimi Base Bridge
Page Major Faults Page Major Faults Page Major Faults
Cursor Pss Cursor Pss Cursor Private Dirty
Dalvik Heap Free Dalvik Heap Free Cursor Pss
.so mmap Shared Dirty .so mmap Private Dirty Dalvik Heap Alloc
Cursor Private Dirty Cursor Private Dirty Ashmed Pss
Fake Player jSMShider Pjapps
Page Minor Faults Page Major Faults Page Major Faults
Dalvik Heap Free Ashmed Pss Cursor Pss
Dalvik Heap Alloc Dalvik Heap Free Dalvik Heap Free
.so mmap Pss Cursor Pss Page Minor Faults
Dalvik Private Dirty Ashmed Shared Dirty Cursor Private Dirty
some of the worst eigenvectors, and then transforming back
to the original space. Relevance of the features is given with
respect to the transformed features space, as opposed to regular
ranking methods that work with the original space; obtained
results are reported in Table I. Initial results show that different
families have different representative features. However, some
features have high importance in every transformed space:
Page Major Faults, Cursor Proportional set size, Dalvik Heap
Free, related to CPU consumption, sharing pages across pro-
cesses, Dalvik allocations, respectively. As a next step towards
the identification of the most indicative symptoms, we plan to
further analyse existing families by clustering them, based on
aforementioned features.
IV. CONCLUSION
The poster presents a new approach to mobile malware
detection, by using general practitioner versus specialist ap-
proach from medical field. Symptoms monitoring application
(an equivalent of a general practitioner) is running on the phone
checking for the symptoms of malware (illnesses), and upon a
detection of a suspicious symptoms triggers appropriate, more
detailed, analysis (an equivalent of an appropriate specialist).
The main focus is on the selection of the most indicative
symptoms for different malware families. The initial results
towards the solution are presented and discussed. Analysed
malware families are obtained from Malware Genome Dataset.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Labs, “Threats report,” McAfee Labs, Tech. Rep., February 2015.
[2] H. Liu and L. Yu, “Toward integrating feature selection algorithms for
classification and clustering,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 491–502, 2005.
[3] W. Enck, M. Ongtang, and P. McDaniel, “On lightweight mobile phone
application certification,” in 16th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security (CCS). ACM, 2009, pp. 235–245.
[4] H. T. T. Truong, E. Lagerspetz, P. Nurmi, A. J. Oliner, S. Tarkoma,
N. Asokan, and S. Bhattacharya, “The company you keep: Mobile
malware infection rates and inexpensive risk indicators.” CoRR, vol.
abs/1312.3245, 2013.
[5] M. Becher, F. C. Freiling, J. Hoffmann, T. Holz, S. Uellenbeck, and
C. Wolf, “Mobile security catching up? revealing the nuts and bolts of
the security of mobile devices,” in Symposium on Security and Privacy,
ser. SP ’11. IEEE Computer Society, 2011, pp. 96–111.
[6] J. Milosevic, A. Dittrich, A. Ferrante, and M. Malek, “A resource-
optimized approach to efficient early detection of mobile malware,” in
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), 2014 Ninth International
Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp. 333–340.
[7] Y. Zhou and X. Jiang, “Dissecting android malware: Characterization and
evolution,” in Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, ser. SP ’12. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society,
2012, pp. 95–109.
[8] M. Hall, E. Frank, G. Holmes, B. Pfahringer, P. Reutemann, and I. H.
Witten, “The weka data mining software: An update,” SIGKDD Explor.
Newsl., vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 10–18, Nov. 2009.
